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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement following the denial of his motion to 
suppress, James Edwin Wolfe pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled 
substance.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three years 
fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wolfe on probation for a period of three 
years.  Mr. Wolfe appealed, asserting the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Wolfe did not show any error in 
the district court’s determination that the initial encounter was consensual and never 
evolved into an unlawful detention, nor did he show error in the district court’s 
determination that the positive drug dog alert provided probable cause to search the 
motorhome pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because 
Mr. Wolfe’s claim was not preserved for appeal.  (See Resp. Br., pp.7-20.) 
 This Reply Brief is necessary to show, contrary to the State’s argument, that 
Mr. Wolfe was seized in the initial encounter with the police when Deputy Nelson told 
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied.  In 
view of all the surrounding circumstances here, a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s 
position, ordered by the deputy to “just wait in your car for me, alright?  I appreciate it,” 
would have believed he was not free to leave.  The State’s contentions based on its 
flawed conclusion that Mr. Wolfe was not seized are unavailing. 
 This Reply Brief is also necessary to concede that Mr. Wolfe’s challenge to the 
drug dog’s certification was not preserved for appeal. 
 2 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Wolfe’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, 
because his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
was violated.  Contrary to the district court’s determination, Mr. Wolfe was seized when 
Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and 
Mr. Schabow complied with the order.  The seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal because it 
was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion.  The taking of Mr. Schabow’s 
driver’s license was unreasonable because it came after the illegal seizure.  Mr. Wolfe’s 
incriminating statements should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  Thus, Mr. Wolfe’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures was violated, and the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
 
B. Mr. Wolfe Was Seized In The Initial Encounter With The Police When 
Mr. Schabow Submitted To Deputy Nelson’s Show Of Authority By Waiting For 
The Deputy In The Motorhome As The Deputy Ordered 
  
Mr. Wolfe asserts he was seized in the initial encounter with the police when 
Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and 
Mr. Schabow complied.  See, e.g., United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 
1993); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 223 (Wyo. 1994); State v. Barnes, 978 P.2d 1131, 
1133, 1135-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).   
 The State acknowledges that “[a] seizure occurs by submission to a show of 
authority where an officer orders a citizen to wait for the officer at a particular place, and 
 5 
the citizen complies with the order.”  (Resp. Br., p.11 (quoting App. Br., p.12) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  The State contends Mr. Schabow voluntarily stopped the 
motorhome and approached Deputy Nelson.  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  But the State then 
argues:  “That Deputy Nelson responded to Mr. Schabow’s action by stating: ‘Just wait 
in your car for me.  Appreciate it.’ (Exhibit 1, 1:12 – 1:15), did not convert what 
Mr. Schabow initiated as a voluntary encounter into a detention by Deputy Nelson.”1  
(Resp. Br., p.12.) 
 While the State impliedly recognizes actions by law enforcement may convert a 
consensual encounter into a seizure, see, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03 
(1983), the State’s argument that Mr. Schabow was not seized flies in the face of that 
recognition.  A seizure by a show of authority occurs “only if, in view of all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that 
he was not free to leave.”  State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165 (2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in a 
particular place by giving the following order:  “Hey man, just wait in your car for me, 
alright?  I appreciate it.”  (See R., pp.86-87; State’s Ex. A, 01:10 – 01:20.)    
The State is essentially arguing that, under the circumstances surrounding this 
encounter, a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position “would have felt free to leave 
or otherwise decline the officer’s requests and terminate the encounter.”  See State v. 
Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653 (1999).  But the State has not offered any legal authority in 
support of its argument that a reasonable person under these surrounding 
                                            
1 As seen above, the State did not cite any legal authority for this argument.  (See Resp. 
Br., p.12.)  Without legal authority, the State has waived this argument, and this Court 
need not consider it.  See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). 
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circumstances would have felt free to leave and disregard Deputy Nelson’s order to wait 
in a particular place for the deputy.  As Mr. Wolfe asserted in the Appellant’s Brief 
(App. Br., pp.12-13), cases from other jurisdictions instead indicate a reasonable person 
under these circumstances would not have felt free to decline Deputy Nelson’s order 
and terminate the encounter.  See, e.g., State v. Ellwood, 757 P.2d 547, 549 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1988) (“[A] seizure did occur, as the State concedes, when Detective Deckard 
told Ellwood and his companion to ‘[w]ait right here.’  At this point Ellwood and his 
companion were not free to leave.” (alteration in original)). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823 
(Ct. App. 1992), further illustrates why the State’s conclusion is flawed.  The Court in 
Zubizareta held a defendant involved in a traffic stop was not seized when an officer 
approached the defendant’s car, attempted to speak with him, and asked him to roll 
down the window.  Zubizareta, 122 Idaho at 827.  Nor was the defendant seized when 
the officer requested the defendant turn off his motor.  Id. at 828.  However, the 
Zubizareta Court held the defendant was seized when the officer told him to “remain 
seated.”  Id.  The officer had testified, “I just asked him to sit there—turn off his engine 
and sit there, which he complied.”  Id. at 825 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
According to the Court, “[a]t that time, a reasonable person in Zubizareta’s position 
would have not felt free to go about his business.”  Id. at 828. 
By telling the defendant to remain seated, the officer in Zubizareta implicitly 
ordered the defendant to wait in his car for the officer, and the defendant complied.  See 
id.  If, as the Idaho Court of Appeals in Zubizareta held, a reasonable person under 
those circumstances would have not felt free to go about his business, a reasonable 
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person under the surrounding circumstances here—where Deputy Nelson explicitly 
ordered Mr. Schabow to wait in his vehicle for the deputy—likewise would have not felt 
free to leave.  See Baker, 141 Idaho at 165.  Thus, the Zubizareta decision shows the 
State’s conclusion is flawed and contrary to legal authority. 
The State additionally contends “the fact that Deputy Nelson did not also tell 
Mr. Schabow that he was ‘free to leave’ did not change the nature of the encounter.”  
(Resp. Br., p.12.)  Although whether an officer tells a citizen he or she is free to leave is 
not dispositive, it is one factor courts consider when analyzing all the surrounding 
circumstances of an encounter with law enforcement.  E.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 503 
(“Royer was never informed that he was free to board his plane if he so chose . . . .”)  
Here, the fact that Deputy Nelson did not tell Mr. Schabow he was free to leave, 
together with the deputy’s order to wait in the vehicle for the deputy and the rest of the 
surrounding circumstances, meant a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.  See Baker, 141 Idaho at 165. 
In view of the surrounding circumstances here, a reasonable person in 
Mr. Schabow’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave.  Contrary to 
the State’s argument, Mr. Schabow was seized when Deputy Nelson told him to wait for 
the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied.  See Coggins, 986 F.2d at 
654; Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223; Barnes, 978 P.2d at 1135-36.  Deputy Nelson also seized 
Mr. Wolfe at that point in the encounter with the police, because Mr. Wolfe was a 
passenger in Mr. Schabow’s motorhome.  See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 
(Ct. App. 2002).  The district court’s determination on when Mr. Wolfe was seized 
was incorrect. 
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C. The Seizure Of Mr. Wolfe Was Illegal Because It Was Not Justified By 
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion 
 
 Mr. Wolfe asserts that his seizure was illegal because it was not justified by 
reasonable, articulable suspicion.  Based on the totality of the circumstances known to 
Deputy Nelson at or before the time of the detention, there was no reasonable suspicion 
justifying Mr. Wolfe’s seizure.   See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). 
 The State has not offered any argument or authority with respect to whether the 
seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal (see Resp. Br., pp.8-13), and thus has waived any 
argument contrary to Mr. Wolfe’s assertion.  See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263 (1996). 
 
D. The Taking of Mr. Schabow’s Driver’s License Was Unreasonable Because It 
Came After Deputy Nelson’s Illegal Seizure 
 
Mr. Wolfe asserts the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable 
because it came after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure of Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe.  
Because the taking came after the illegal seizure, State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 
(1992), does not justify the taking.   
The State’s counterargument on this point, because it is based on the State’s 
flawed conclusion that Mr. Wolfe was not seized when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow 
to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied (see Resp. 
Br., pp.13-16), is unavailing.  Without support from Godwin or any other justification, the 
taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable. 
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E. The Issue Of The Drug Dog’s Certification Was Not Preserved For Appeal 
 The State argues Mr. Wolfe’s “claim regarding the drug dog is not preserved.”  
(Resp. Br., p.16.)   The State contends Mr. Wolfe could have challenged the reliability of 
the drug dog in his initial motion to suppress or in response to the State’s memorandum, 
but did not.  (Resp. Br., pp.17-19.)  This point is well-taken.  Thus, Mr. Wolfe concedes 
that his challenge to the drug dog’s certification was not preserved for appeal.  See 
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 
F. Mr. Wolfe’s Incriminating Statements Should Have Been Suppressed As The 
Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree 
 
 Mr. Wolfe asserts his incriminating statements should have been suppressed as 
the fruit of the poisonous tree.  See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11.  All of Mr. Wolfe’s 
incriminating statements came after his illegal seizure by Deputy Nelson.  (See 
R., p.89.)  Thus, the incriminating statements came from exploitation of the original 
illegality, and should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.  See Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 810.   
The State’s counterargument on this point, because it is based on the State’s 
flawed conclusion that Mr. Wolfe was not seized when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow 
to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied (see Resp. 
Br., p.20), is unavailing.  Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating statements should have been 
suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.   
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order which denied his 
motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction, and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 14th day of April, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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